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This Symposium volume of the Vanderbilt Law Review,
sponsored by the Institute for Law and Economic Policy ("ILEP"),
focuses on the critical role of institutional investors in the modern
American corporation. The agency cost model of the corporation tells
us that in a dispersed ownership system, such as the U.S. system,
large, motivated shareholders can play an important role in reducing
the agency costs of equity by closely monitoring the actions of
corporate management.1 Activist investors can use their voting
* My thanks to James Cox, Jesse Fried, Jeffrey Gordon, Lyman Johnson, Robert
Thompson, and Elliott Weiss for their comments. All errors are, of course, my responsibility.
1. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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powers, their power to file suit, and their power to sell their interests
in the firm, to align the interests of managers and shareholders more
closely.2 In this volume, seven different articles by a total of ten
authors explore the theory and reality of institutional investors acting
as monitors of corporate management.
Beginning in the early 1990s, institutional investor
shareholder activism was praised as a promising means of reducing
managerial agency costs. 3 The theory was simple: if shareholder
monitoring could limit managers' divergence from the goal of
shareholder wealth maximization, then institutional shareholders
were well positioned to act as effective monitors. Institutions held
larger blocks of stock than most other investors and collectively held
well over fifty percent of the stock of most large public companies.
Acting together, these shareholders would have the power and the
incentives to push for good corporate governance and to nudge
managers to pursue wealth-maximizing strategies.
Criticisms of institutional activism quickly emerged. Many
institutions were reluctant to incur the expenses of engaging in
monitoring activities because this could depress portfolio returns,
whereas any benefits would be shared with their competitors. Thorny
collective action problems arose as the costs of communication and
coordination were higher than hoped. Other institutions engaged in
free riding on the efforts of the activists, and some institutions refused
to engage in activism at companies where they had significant
conflicts of interest arising out of pre-existing (or hoped for)
commercial relationships. 4 Furthermore, certain institutions, such as
public pension and labor union funds, suffered their own agency cost
problems and were accused of pursuing their own self-interested
agendas at the expense of other shareholders. 5 Overall, it was unclear
whether these costs would outweigh the benefits so that the great
potential for activism by institutional investors would ever be realized.
Today, a significant number of institutional investors are
active participants in the U.S. corporate governance debate. This is
displayed most prominently by institutional investor lead plaintiffs in
2. Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting
Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 216-18 (1999).
3. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990);
Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991).
4. Edward Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder
Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991).




securities fraud class actions, but also in a broad range of other forms
of activism, such as institutionally sponsored shareholder proposals,
withhold the vote campaigns, majority vote initiatives, and a host of
other actions. Each of the articles in this volume explores different
ways that institutional investors have acted, should act, or do not act,
as monitors of corporate management. The articles share the common
belief that institutional investors have the power to bring down
managerial agency costs, even when they differ over their views about
the willingness or the ability of institutions to exercise that power.
In this introduction to the volume, I organize the different
articles according to the topics that they raise, then situate them
within the current debate related to that topic, and finally relate them
to the overall theme of institutional investor activism. To the extent
possible, I follow the conference program's organizational framework.
In my concluding remarks, I raise the question whether hedge fund
shareholder activists may be the new wave of activist shareholders
and ask how institutional investors should respond to their activities.
I. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
CEO pay levels have been a hot topic for corporate governance
activists in recent years. Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried's
well-known book, Pay Without Performance,6 lays out a stinging
indictment of current executive pay practices in this country. That
book's thesis is that executive compensation practices in the United
States benefit corporate executives at the expense of shareholders. It
argues that CEO employment contracts are bad for shareholders
because they are the product of "managerial power." Managerial
power arises, the authors claim, because boards of directors at public
companies are beholden to the firm's top executives, largely due to
management's control over the director nomination process. A weak
compensation committee thus does little to protect the firm in its pay
negotiations with the CEO, leading to levels of executive pay that both
are inappropriately high and have inappropriately low levels of
incentives. The only constraint on this process is investor and public
"outrage." This outrage constraint, however, only polices extreme
cases of executive overcompensation.
In this Symposium, Professor Fried continues his work in the
area with his article, Hands-Off Options. In this piece, Fried proposes
6. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004).
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a new approach to executives' equity compensation arrangements that
would remove managers' ability to schedule freely the disposition of
their stock. He argues that top corporate executives at public
companies currently can choose the timing of their stock sales and sell
substantial blocks of stock over a short time period. Managers' ability
to choose when to sell permits executives to use inside information to
time their sales and their ability to sell large amounts of stock at once
give them an incentive to manipulate the stock price before selling in
order to maximize their gains at substantial cost to other
shareholders. He points out how existing legal rules and compensation
arrangements do little, or nothing, to solve this problem, which can
lead to distorted corporate decisionmaking.
Fried suggests that institutional investors urge firms to adopt
a policy of issuing "hands-off options." Under this approach, firms
would continue to issue stock options (or restricted stock) in
appropriate situations to their top executives. However, at the time of
an equity grant, a firm would announce a fixed and gradual schedule
under which the executive's options or stock would be cashed out in
the future. By implementing a fixed and pre-announced sales
program, firms would remove executives' control over the timing of
equity sales and thereby make it impossible for them to generate
insider trading profits while unwinding their equity positions. And by
depriving managers of the ability to unload large stock positions at
one time, the arrangement would give executives much less incentive
to manipulate the stock price than they currently have.
Institutional investors are very concerned about the current
levels of executive compensation. They have tried a variety of
techniques to limit CEO pay increases, including shareholder
proposals, advisory shareholder votes (sometimes called "say on pay"),
voting against stock option plans, and in a few prominent cases,
withhold the vote campaigns. None of these efforts has had more than
a temporary, isolated impact on CEO pay levels and composition in
this country. If implemented, Fried's proposal could dramatically
impact CEO pay and stock ownership levels.
How would institutional investors get boards to adopt hands-off
options? Consistent with his belief in managerial power, Fried does
not expect this new form of stock option to be adopted willingly by
corporate boards. Institutional investors would need to exert strong
pressure on boards, presumably through informal meetings with
corporate directors, shareholder proposals urging companies to adopt
this type of option, and withhold the vote campaigns against targeted
302 [Vol. 61:2:299
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boards that refuse to move in this direction. 7 Given the response to
prior shareholder initiatives on executive compensation, it is likely
that institutional shareholders will be more successful with indirect
pressure on directors; that is, by relying on the explicit or implicit
threat of using their voting power if boards are unresponsive to their
requests.
II. THE PROPOSED SHAREHOLDER NOMINATION RULE
The Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC's") proposed
shareholder nomination rule, although it ultimately failed, was
considered seriously as a result of pressure from institutional
investors. The concept of shareholders having the right to nominate
directors through the company's proxy has a long history, but it came
to a head four years ago at the SEC at the initiative of then-Chairman
William Donaldson. During Donaldson's tenure, the SEC considered a
variety of proposals related to whether certain large shareholders
should have the ability to nominate board candidates using the
company's proxy materials.8 Unfortunately from the institutions'
perspective, these proposals never came to a vote before the SEC.
Instead, only in 2007, in reaction to the Second Circuit's decision in
AFSMCE v. AJG,9 were two proposals related to the issue of
shareholder access to director nominations brought to a vote at the
Commission.10 After a bitter debate, the SEC voted three to one to
adopt a rule broadly denying shareholders this right. The vote split
along party lines, with all of the Republican nominees voting against
and the sole Democrat voting in favor of, allowing shareholders to
make these nominations. Chairman Cox has stated that he intends to
reconsider the issue again in the near future.
Jeff Gordon's contribution to the Symposium claims that
institutional investors should be happy that the SEC did not adopt an
access rule. He argues that the current debate over proxy access is a
"side show," diverting attention away from more important questions
about the appropriate level of disclosure that shareholders should
7. Neither suing nor selling appear likely avenues for institutions to pursue in the near
future, as there is nothing illegal about the current form of stock options and virtually all
corporations distribute them to their executives.
8. Neal Lipschutz, SEC Chairman Cox's proxy-access good deed will be punished, Dow
JONES NEWSWIRES, Nov. 28, 2007, available at http://blogs.rockymountainnews.com/denver/
materialdisclosures/archives/2007/l 1/columnistdefen.html.
9. 462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006).
10. Carrie Johnson, SEC Proposal Raises Profile of Investors; Divided Panel Tackles Issues
of Pay, Board Membership, WASH. POST, July 26, 2007, at DO.
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have to make when they seek to place candidates on corporate boards
of directors. Gordon first traces the history of modern shareholder
activism and the origins of the proposed shareholder nomination rules.
He then moves to a discussion of the new e-proxy rules that permit
soliciting investors to post their materials on web sites and to provide
electronic access to their fellow shareholders. He points out that the
lower costs associated with this form of solicitation should markedly
reduce the cost of a dissident shareholder proxy solicitation, without
any need for access to the issuer's proxy statement.
Gordon frames the crucial question to be: How much disclosure
should shareholder nominator's have to make, both in terms of content
and potential liability risk? The federal proxy rules spell out quite
carefully what is required both of the nominator and the nominee
when a shareholder engages in a proxy solicitation. However,
according to Gordon, what was widely overlooked in the debate over
the SEC's proposed proxy access rules is that the SEC would have
required much more intrusive disclosures for shareholder nominators
seeking proxy access than it does for shareholders that engage in
traditional solicitation campaigns. These more extensive disclosures
are not only costly, but they also increase the litigation risk for
proponents. So, Gordon concludes, institutional investors should stop
seeking to persuade the SEC to change the rules for proxy access and
instead focus on engaging in e-proxy solicitations when they wish to
nominate director candidates.
Gordon's thesis is supported by data on recent proxy contests.
Hedge funds have been very active in using short slate contests to
obtain positions on corporate boards." Most of these solicitations seek
to elect a minority of the board of directors without using the target
company's proxy materials. Clearly, it is possible for institutional
investors to engage in this type of solicitation as well, or at least to
support hedge fund activists if the institution believes that corporate
change is in order.
When all else fails, institutional investors always can choose to
sue corporate managers. A variety of causes of action are available in
different venues. Two broad types of claims can be made: (1) cases
based on alleged breaches of fiduciary duties and (2) claims arising out
of defective disclosures. The articles in the next two Parts examine
11. Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance,




some of the issues that arise for institutional investors in derivative
suits and in cases arising out of the Investment Company Act of 1940.
III. STATE LAW LITIGATION AS A MECHANISM TO ENFORCE
FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Derivative actions, in which one shareholder sues in the name
of, and on behalf of, the corporation, were initially lauded for their
impact on agency costs. 12 However, states soon began focusing on their
potential to be used as strike suit litigation, passing statutes requiring
plaintiffs in derivative actions to post bonds to insure that they could
pay corporate defendants' attorneys' fees and expenses in frivolous
suits. 13 More recently, state legislatures have added procedural
hurdles, such as the demand requirement and provisions that allow
special independent litigation committees comprised of selected
directors to recommend to courts that they terminate derivative
suits.1 4 As a result of these restrictions and the availability of other
types of remedies for investors, the number of derivative suits has
declined markedly in recent years. Empirical studies show that
compared to federal securities class actions, or to state court
acquisition-oriented class actions, derivative suits are running a weak
third in terms of their importance to shareholders.
1 5
Against this backdrop, Dean Kenneth Davis argues in favor of
reviving derivative litigation in U.S. corporate law in his article, The
Forgotten Derivative Suit. His thesis is that derivative suits are
primarily playing a role at publicly held corporations in transactions
involving control shareholders abusing their dominant positions, or at
closely held corporations, but not at larger capitalization firms where
investors are claiming that the board is being sued for some wrongful
act at the corporate level. He argues that the availability of
alternatives to, or substitutes for, the derivative suit is driving this
phenomenon. He uses both doctrinal analysis and an empirical survey
of judicial decisions to support these claims.
12. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) (noting that derivative
suits have "long been the chief regulator of corporate management").
13. N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 61-b (1944) (current version at § 627). This statute followed a
critical report about derivative litigation by Franklin Wood, for a committee of the Chamber of
Commerce of the State of New York. FRANKLIN S. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING
STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS (1944).
14. See, e.g., George W. Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation:
The Death of Derivative Suits, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 96 (1980).
15. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative
Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747 (2004).
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Davis begins by reviewing and explaining the reasons for the
historical shift toward the use of independent directors as monitors of
corporate conduct and the accompanying, more restrictive approach by
courts and legislatures toward derivative litigation through the
creation of a variety of procedural barriers to plaintiffs in these cases.
He then divides derivative suits into three categories by type of
defendant and, in some cases, by type of claim as well: first, claims of
all types against closely held corporations; second, public companies
where the plaintiffs claim is that the board has engaged in some
improper conduct; and finally, public companies where the allegations
in the complaint focus on abuse of control by a control shareholder.
For each of these groups, he examines the outcomes of judicial
opinions in the cases, the availability of other avenues of relief for
plaintiffs, and the public policy reasons for permitting, or curtailing,
derivative suits on the particular type of claims being made.
For closely held firms, Davis finds little evidence that the
demand requirement is a major obstacle to plaintiffs, but he does see
standing issues successfully raised by defendants in some cases. He
concludes that derivative suits have had some success in this context,
but careful contracting by the parties in these smaller firms can
substitute for these suits. The improper conduct cases at public
companies, featuring claims such as the board's failure to establish
proper internal controls, demonstrate very low success rates. The one
exception is cases involving claims of excessive executive
compensation. Davis suggests that the presence of many alternative
avenues of relief, such as SEC enforcement actions or private
securities class actions, may underpin the courts' willingness to
dismiss derivative suits raising similar claims. Finally, in derivative
cases challenging control shareholder abuses, Davis finds a relatively
high success rate with demand a weak barrier, although standing
issues frequently arise in change-of-control-related cases. He sees
fewer good substitutes for investors who bring these cases and some
important policy arguments for supporting them.
In addition to investors' state court rights to enforce director
fiduciary duties, the 1940 Investment Company Act contains an
express federal cause of action-section 36(b)-that uses the concept
of directors' duties. Lyman Johnson's article examines the possibility
of reinvigorating private litigation over excessive mutual fund fees,
using an expanded perspective on director independence under the
1940 Investment Company Act. Johnson begins by talking about the
agency conflicts between investors and mutual fund advisors, and the
importance of independent board negotiations plus private litigation
[Vol. 61:2:299306
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as a means of addressing any divergences in their interests. He then
moves to summarizing the existing empirical evidence on the effect of
board independence at mutual funds and finds that when
independence is defined broadly, independent directors appear to get
investors a better deal.
The second half of the article critiques the Second Circuit's
1982 Gartenberg decision, 16 which has effectively precluded successful
investor litigation over excessive fees, and examines how a concept of
director independence borrowed from corporate law might better serve
the courts in determining when advisory fees are excessive. In
particular, Johnson suggests that the federal courts use the more
fluid, evolving notion of director independence applied in state
corporate law as part of a more searching analysis under section
36(b)(2) of the Act of the meaning of independent director approval of
the advisory contract. This would permit courts to give deference to
such approval only when truly independent directors approve these
agreements and thereby provide mutual funds with strong incentives
to adopt stronger independence standards for their directors.
Although neither Davis nor Johnson focuses exclusively on
institutional investor rights, the size of institutional stockholdings
makes their articles very relevant to these investors. In both cases,
institutional investors must be willing to get involved in these suits in
order to make them more effective mechanisms for reducing agency
costs. A relevant example could be drawn from the federal class action
area, where such institutional investor involvement expressly was
contemplated by Congress in the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"). Indeed, just as institutions assuming the role
of lead plaintiffs in securities class actions have enabled those suits to
gain dignity in the eyes of the courts and policymakers, the same
effect may be achieved if institutions assume a similar role in
derivative suits.
IV. PRIVATE SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
WITH THE LEAD PLAINTIFF PROVISION
The lead plaintiff provision in the PSLRA introduced
procedures for courts to apply in choosing a lead plaintiff for the class
from among competing petitioners. Institutional investors widely were
seen as the most desirable candidates for this position. Under these
rules, the investor with the largest financial losses in a securities
16. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
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fraud class action is presumed to be the most adequate plaintiff. In
this way, the lead plaintiff provision overrides the traditional "first to
file" rule for selecting the suit's plaintiff in an effort to use an
institutional lead plaintiffs economic self-interest to reduce the
agency costs of lawyer-driven class action litigation. Moreover, by
eliminating the race to be the first to file, the lead plaintiff provision
cuts down on poorly drafted, hastily filed complaints by overly eager
plaintiffs' counsel.
To evaluate the impact of the lead plaintiff provision, who
better to ask than one of its creators? Elliott Weiss, whose seminal
article with John Beckerman launched the lead plaintiff provision,
reflects back on the enduring logic of their work, the enactment of that
statutory requirement, and its intended and unintended
consequences. His article begins with an interesting summary of the
authors' thinking behind that article, Let the Money Do the
Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in
Securities Class Actions,17 and how Congress came to incorporate its
recommendations into the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995. Weiss then makes three contributions to the literature: first, he
summarizes empirical research on the lead plaintiff provision's effects;
second, he examines some of the practical issues that courts have
grappled with as they have tried to implement its provisions; and
finally, he asks the policy question whether we can do better.
Weiss concludes that the evidence shows that the lead plaintiff
provisions have had several beneficial effects, including increasing
institutional investor involvement in managing securities fraud class
actions, particularly in large cases, with resultant increased recoveries
and lower levels of attorneys' fees. He finds that courts generally have
done a good job interpreting the statutory requirements of the lead
plaintiff provision over the years, although he has reservations about
their initial preference for groups of investors over institutional
investors. He also points out the practical difficulty courts face in
determining which investor has the largest loss. Weiss finishes by
noting that no one has suggested a superior alternative to the current
provisions and by suggesting three ways in which those provisions
should be fine-tuned.
The importance of the lead plaintiff provision has led to a
flurry of empirical articles that seek to assess its success.18 James Cox,
17. 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995).
18. Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of
the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869
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Lynn Bai, and I add to that body of work in There Are Plaintiffs
and... There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class
Action Settlements. We begin with an overview of the current calls for
further narrowing of the scope of securities fraud class actions in the
United States. We examine reports issued by three different groups-
the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, the Commission on the
Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st Century, and McKinsey
& Company--each of which argues that securities fraud class actions
are one of the principal causes for U.S. capital markets being placed at
a competitive disadvantage to foreign markets. We analyze the
changes proposed in each of these reports and conclude that, with a
couple of exceptions, they do not seek wholesale changes to securities
fraud class actions.
We next turn to the issues that we believe are central to
determining whether further reforms to securities class actions are
warranted. In particular, we start our empirical evaluation by looking
at whether the lead plaintiff provision is operating satisfactorily. We
find that, overall, institutional investor lead plaintiffs get greater
dollar settlements for investors, although this effect is only positive
and significant for labor union pension funds and public pension
funds. This suggests that the lead plaintiff provision is operating in
the manner that Congress intended when it enacted the PSLRA and
that continued encouragement of institutional participation as lead
plaintiffs would be good policy.
The second part of our empirical analysis focuses on the
question of whether securities class actions are so-called strike suits.
We try to answer this question by focusing on those cases in our
sample with settlements of less than $2 to $3 million. We find that
these settlements produce statistically significantly lower recoveries
as a percentage of estimated provable losses. We interpret this to be
consistent with the hypothesis that these are strike suits.
The lead plaintiff provision is one of the success stories of
PSLRA and institutional investor activism. However, in the next Part,
we turn to some of the limitations on these investors' activist efforts.
(2005); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas with Dana Kiku, Does The Plaintiff Matter? An
Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587
(2006); Michael A. Perino, Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of




V. THE LIMITS ON INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVISM
The empirical evidence on the effects of institutional investor
activism is quite mixed. As noted above, several studies have shown
that institutional lead plaintiffs add value in securities fraud class
actions. However, other forms of corporate governance oriented
activism seem to produce less value for shareholders. For example,
beginning in the mid-1980s, public pension funds and other activist
investors began engaging in shareholder activism using Rule 14a-8,
which permits shareholder proposals on a variety of topics. Their
efforts had little effect on firm value or performance however. 19 Larger
public pension funds tried a variety of other techniques to influence
corporate management, but these also had little impact on operating
performance or stock price. 20 As several surveys have shown, the
results of this type of activism by non-hedge fund institutions have
been disappointing: they caused small changes to firms' corporate
governance structures but no measurable effects on stock prices or
earnings. 21
In a useful addition to the existing empirical research on
institutional investor activism, Stephen Choi and Jill Fisch's
contribution to the Symposium critically examines how active
institutional investors really are on corporate governance issues.
Using a combination of interviews, survey evidence, and publicly
available information, Choi and Fisch construct a fuller, more
textured picture than previously available of what public pension fund
investors do, and more importantly don't do, as activists. They begin
by summarizing survey data that they collected from a group of forty
public pension funds. Their first main finding is that many of these
funds delegate their portfolio's management, their voting decisions,
19. Jonathan Karpoff et al., Corporate Governance and Shareholder Initiatives: Empirical
Evidence, 42 J. FIN. ECON. 365 (1996).
20. Willard T. Carleton et al., The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance
Through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF, 53 J. FIN. 1335 (1998); Diane Del
Guercio & Jennifer Hawkins, The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism, 52 J. FIN.
ECON. 293 (1999); Sunil Wahal, Pension Fund Activism and Firm Performance, 31 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1 (1996). But see Brad M. Barber, Monitoring the Monitor: Evaluating
CalPERS' Shareholder Activism (Nov. 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=890321 (finding positive stock price reaction to CalPERS corporate
governance activities).
21. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States,
in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., 1998);
Stuart Gillan & Laura Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN.
118 (2007); Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable
Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174 (2001).
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their claims filing, and their litigation monitoring to outside advisors.
This suggests that it is very important to examine the incentives of
the various agents that are exercising these powers on behalf of
institutions to make sure that they are aligned with those of their
principals.
Furthermore, contrary to the claim that institutions' portfolios
are indexed, they find that less than a third of these funds' assets are
indexed. 22 This raises doubts about the claim that institutions own the
market and therefore must engage in activism if they wish to improve
corporate performance, because they cannot sell their stock if they are
dissatisfied with corporate management.
Using their survey data, they unpack the types and amount of
activism in which these public funds engage. They divide activist
behavior into two categories: "non-litigation oriented activism," such
as filing shareholder proposals or withholding votes from selected
directors, and "litigation-oriented activism," where funds act as lead
plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions or are significantly involved
in other forms of litigation. They find substantial variations in the
overall levels of activism between public funds. On average, public
funds engage in a limited spectrum of non-litigation oriented activism,
mostly centered on supporting other types of activist investors,
following advice from their proxy voting advisors in withhold vote
campaigns, or similar low-cost activities.
They find that larger funds demonstrate much higher levels of
non-litigation forms of activism than smaller sized public funds, but
there is no such relationship for litigation-oriented activism. Funds of
all sizes on average appear to be relatively active in litigation. The
authors offer three possible explanations for this result: first, political
pressure from groups such as state attorneys' general; second, the lack
of costs to the fund from participation in these cases because plaintiffs'
law firms take them on a contingent fee basis and pay the out of
pocket costs associated with the cases; or third, that the institutions
may expend very little effort in monitoring the cases so that there are
no real costs to their involvement in the action.2 3 In sum, Choi and
Fisch's evidence on the low level of institutional investor activism
suggests that if shareholder activism is to be an important monitoring
22. They do not provide similar statistics indicating what percentage of the institutions'
stock portfolios are indexed.
23. Unfortunately, they lack data to test the hypothesis that funds participate in litigation,
irrespective of the fund's overall size, because they have large underlying losses on their
investments in the firms they are suing.
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force in U.S. firms, we may need to look elsewhere to find investor
activists.
CONCLUSION
If Choi and Fisch are right, then shareholder activism will need
to look beyond public pension funds in its quest to locate active
monitors of corporate management. In fact, we need not look far to
find some powerful investor activists. Beginning roughly in 2000,
there has been a marked uptick in the level of hedge fund shareholder
activism. Recent research on these investors has found that these
activists have pressured corporate directors to remove
underperforming managers, to stop value destroying mergers and
acquisitions, to disgorge excess cash and optimize capital structure,
and to press for a sale of the company, all of which are designed to
increase shareholder value.24 These papers have concluded that hedge
funds are better positioned to act as informed monitors than most
institutional investors, and their activism has been well perceived by
the market.
Hedge funds benefit from friendly interaction with
management, like large block holders, but they have stronger
incentives to add value, and they can capture the benefits of multiple
stakes. Although there is enormous cross-sectional variation, hedge
fund activism generates value on average, not merely because
activists are good stock pickers, but because they credibly commit
upfront to intervene at undervalued firms on behalf of shareholders
and then follow through on their commitments. Thus, activist hedge
funds have the potential to fill some of the governance gaps left by
other large institutional investors during recent decades. In practice,
institutional investors frequently have supported the hedge funds in
their activism and adapted themselves to the rapid evolution in
investor monitoring.
Each of the articles in this Symposium sheds new light on the
ever-changing role of institutional investors in U.S. corporate
governance and corporate litigation. They cover a broad range of
topics, including institutional investor activism on executive
compensation, proxy access initiatives at the SEC, state and federal
litigation, and the current levels of activism by public pension funds.
24. William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, GEO. L.J. (2007); Brav et
al., supra note 11; Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (2007).
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The data and the theoretical contributions of these articles provide
important foundation for the ongoing discussion about the role of
institutional investors.

